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1 Introduction
The impact of exchange rate movements on consumer prices plays a central role in determining
how open economies adjust to economic shocks. The extent of exchange rate pass-through matters
for optimal monetary policy design (Corsetti and Pesenti 2005), international shock transmission
(Corsetti and Dedola 2005) and the welfare consequences of exchange rate changes (Devereux,
Engel and Tille 2003). High pass-through facilitates adjustment, but also implies the domestic
economy is more exposed to exchange rate fluctuations.
In this paper, we study the consumer price effects of the depreciation of sterling after the United
Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU) in June 2016. Brexit is the most important
policy shock to hit the UK economy in recent decades and the depreciation offers an attractive
setting for analyzing the price consequences of an exchange rate shock. The fall in sterling was
unanticipated, sharp and persistent and, unlike most sudden depreciations, affected the currency of
a major industrialized economy.
Moreover, the depreciation was not caused by a shock to contemporaneous economic condi-
tions that could directly affect consumer prices holding the exchange rate fixed. Instead, it resulted
from a political event that changed expectations about future economic policy. The Brexit vote led
currency investors to anticipate that barriers to trade and immigration between the UK and the EU
would rise at some unknown future date, while also increasing economic uncertainty in the UK.
This shift in expectations led to the depreciation of the pound. As Forbes, Hjortsoe and Nenova
(2018) highlight, pass-through from exchange rate movements to inflation depends on why the ex-
change rate changes. We are not aware of previous studies that have estimated pass-through using
an exchange rate shock comparable to the UK’s vote to leave the EU.
In addition to providing new evidence on exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices, our
analysis sheds light on how the decision to leave the EU has affected the UK economy. Recent
increases in protectionism around the world have provided fresh impetus to efforts aimed at under-
standing the consequences of raising trade barriers (Evenett 2019). We contribute to this objective
by studying how adopting a policy of international disintegration affects economic outcomes in
advance of the policy coming into effect.
Economic theory suggests pass-through will vary across countries and over time depending on
an economy’s openness to imports (Goldberg and Campa 2010), the distribution costs of bring-
ing goods to market (Burstein, Neves and Rebelo 2003), the source of exchange rate movements
(Campa and Goldberg 2005; Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc 2008; Forbes, Hjortsoe and Nenova
2018), the currency in which trade is invoiced (Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon 2010; Auer,
Burstein and Lein 2018; Chen, Chung and Novy 2018) and whether mark-ups adjust in response to
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exchange rate variation (Dornbusch 1987, Krugman 1987).1 Motivated by this literature, our em-
pirical strategy uses product-level differences in exposure to import costs to isolate price variation
caused by the exchange rate decline.
We start by developing a model of consumer prices that includes both direct import consump-
tion and indirect expenditure on imports used as intermediate inputs in domestic production and
takes into account input-output linkages across sectors as well as distribution margins that drive a
wedge between basic prices and purchaser prices. The model shows how the elasticity of consumer
prices to the exchange rate depends upon the share of import costs in consumer expenditure. Ex-
change rate movements lead to larger price changes in product groups with higher import shares.
Guided by the model, we use UK input-output tables for 2013 to calculate the import share for
each of the product groups that comprise the consumer expenditure basket.2
The share of imports in aggregate UK consumer expenditure is 0.29, of which 16 percentage
points is directly consumed imports, while the remainder is imported intermediates used in domes-
tic production. The aggregate import share masks substantial heterogeneity across product groups
with tradable products mostly having higher import shares than services. For example, the import
share of Education is 0.05, while that of New cars is 0.64.
Using the import share variable, we estimate the consumer price effects of the Brexit depre-
ciation from two alternative specifications. First, we consider an event study specification that
regresses the log difference of consumer prices by product group on the import share interacted
with a treatment dummy that switches on after the Brexit referendum. We find that following the
referendum the increase in inflation was higher for product groups with larger import shares. This
not only shows that the Brexit vote led to higher consumer prices, but also confirms the empirical
relevance of distribution costs and non-traded goods in shaping heterogeneity across products in
consumer price pass-through. We also find that producer price index inflation was higher in sectors
with a larger share of imported intermediates in production costs. This result supports Goldberg
and Campa’s (2010) argument that the extent of imported input use by domestic producers affects
the magnitude of exchange rate pass-through.
We cannot use the event study specification to estimate pass-through because it does not con-
trol for exchange rate variation in the periods before and after the referendum. Therefore, we also
estimate a second specification where we interact the import share with the log difference of the
exchange rate and its lags. We estimate the pass-through specification on a window around the
Brexit vote using quarterly data from 2011Q1 to 2018Q2 and including between four and eight
exchange rate lags. Summing the estimated coefficients on the exchange rate-import share inter-
1See Burstein and Gopinath (2014) for a comprehensive review of the exchange rate pass-through literature.
2Goldberg and Campa (2010) use a similar import share measure to undertake an accounting decomposition of
exchange rate pass-through in OECD countries. By contrast, we show how import shares can be combined with
disaggregated price data to identify pass-through empirically.
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actions gives a measure of pass-through conditional on import shares, which we refer to as import
cost pass-through.3
We find robust evidence of high pass-through. In particular, we cannot reject the hypothesis
of complete import cost pass-through, meaning that a 10 percent depreciation increases consumer
prices by 1 percent for each 10 percentage point rise in the import share. In contrast to our esti-
mates, most exchange rate pass-through studies find incomplete pass-through to border prices and
import costs (Burstein and Gopinath 2014). For example, in a study of the 2015 appreciation of
the Swiss franc, Auer, Burstein and Lein (2018) find incomplete border price pass-through due, in
large part, to the price stickiness of imports invoiced in Swiss francs.
However, studies of recent US tariff increases have found evidence of complete pass-through
to import prices (Amiti, Redding and Weinstein 2019; Fajgelbaum et al. 2019) and, in the case of
washing machines, a consumer price elasticity to tariffs in excess of 100 percent (Flaaen, Hortac¸su
and Tintelnot 2019). Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005) also find evidence of high pass-
through to import costs following several large devaluation episodes and show that price changes
following large devaluations are driven by tradeable products, whereas smaller exchange rate fluc-
tuations lead to deviations from relative purchasing power parity for traded goods. Our results are
consistent with these findings.
Complete import cost pass-through implies that pass-through to consumer prices equals the
import share, both at the product group level and on aggregate. This means that aggregate pass-
through to consumer prices equals the aggregate import share of 0.29. Since the Brexit vote led
sterling to depreciate by around 10 percent, our results imply the Brexit depreciation raised con-
sumer prices by 2.9 percent by June 2018. This is equivalent to an increase in the cost of living for
the average UK household of £870 per year. As there is no evidence of a countervailing increase in
nominal incomes, our findings imply the Brexit depreciation has had a substantial negative effect
on real wages and living standards in the UK.
We also analyze the distributional consequences of the Brexit depreciation by calculating how
the increase in the cost of living varies across households with different expenditure patterns.
Households that spend more on product groups with higher import shares are harder hit. We find
that a household at the 75th percentile of the distribution of cost of living increases experienced a
one percentage point larger increase in inflation from the Brexit depreciation than a household at
the 25th percentile.
Comparing households in different deciles of the income distribution shows that the costs are
evenly shared across income levels because there is no systematic correlation between income and
3To avoid the possibility of confusion, note that import cost pass-through is not the same as pass-through to import
prices at the border. Instead, it equals the elasticity of consumer prices to the exchange rate, when exchange rate
changes are scaled by the share of imports in consumer expenditure. Consequently, it depends upon both pass-through
at the border and how border prices feed through to consumer prices.
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the share of imports in household expenditure. However, the inflation impact differs considerably
across regions. Households in Northern Ireland and Wales fared worst since they spend a relatively
higher fraction of income on high import share products such as food and drink, clothing and fuel.
By contrast, households in London were least affected due to their relatively larger expenditure on
rent, which has a low import share.
Our estimate that pass-through to consumer prices equals 0.29 is larger than estimates obtained
without accounting for import share heterogeneity across product groups. Pass-through to con-
sumer prices is most frequently estimated by regressing log changes in the aggregate consumer
price index on log changes in the trade-weighted exchange rate and its lags, while controlling for
foreign production costs. Goldberg and Campa (2010) report that using this approach actually de-
livers a negative pass-through estimate for the UK after four quarters, while Burstein and Gopinath
(2014) estimate pass-through of 0.14 after eight quarters for a consumer price measure that ex-
cludes services. Forbes, Hjortsoe and Nenova (2018) estimate pass-through for the UK using a
structural vector autoregression framework. They find that pass-through varies depending upon
the source of the exchange rate shock, but the average pass-through to consumer prices in their
sample after eight quarters is 0.13.
Similarly, using our estimation specification and data, but not interacting the exchange rate
terms with the import share, delivers a pass-through estimate of around 0.15. This estimate is bi-
ased downwards because, without including the interactions terms, we cannot control for quarter
fixed effects to capture other time-varying inflationary pressures that may be correlated with ex-
change rate movements. The comparison illustrates the importance of using data on import share
heterogeneity across products to estimate pass-through to consumer prices.
In addition to shedding new light on the relationship between exchange rates and consumer
prices, our results contribute to the emerging literature that uses Brexit to analyze the effects of
economic disintegration.4 Prior to the referendum, most research predicted that leaving the EU
would reduce the UK’s long-run income per capita because it would increase barriers to trade
and immigration (Dhingra et al. 2017, Sampson 2017). These long-run forecasts cannot yet be
evaluated. However, our analysis shows that, even though the UK currently remains part of the
EU, voters are already paying a price for Brexit because of the cost of living increase caused by
the post-referendum depreciation.
In related work, Born et al. (2019) use the synthetic control method to estimate that the Brexit
vote had reduced UK GDP at the end of 2018 by between 1.7 and 2.5 percent. Interestingly, they
find that most of this effect is driven by lower consumption growth. Our results suggest that the
4See, for example, Costa, Dhingra and Machin (2019) on nominal wages, Bloom et al. (2019) on investment and
productivity, Breinlich et al. (2019) on foreign investment, and Crowley, Exton and Han (2018) on the extensive
margin of trade.
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Brexit depreciation contributed to the reduction in GDP growth documented by Born et al. by
driving up consumer prices leading to lower consumption growth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides more back-
ground on the Brexit referendum and the subsequent depreciation of sterling. Section 3 develops
a simple model of how import costs affect consumer prices, which we use to define our import
share measure. Section 4 then introduces our data and explains how the import share is calculated
from input-output tables. Section 5 presents results from the event study estimates, while Section
6 covers the pass-through specification. Section 7 then uses the results to quantify how the Brexit
depreciation has affected the cost of living in the UK. Finally, Section 8 offers some concluding
remarks.
2 The Brexit vote and sterling
Prior to the Brexit referendum, opinion polls predicted a close vote. By contrast, betting markets
implied around an 85 percent probability that the UK would choose to remain in the EU (The
Economist 2016), reflecting the conventional wisdom that undecided voters would opt for the
status quo. However, on 23 June 2016, 52 percent of UK voters supported leaving the EU.
The Brexit vote did not lead to any immediate changes in the UK’s economic relationships with
the EU or the rest of the world. The UK only officially notified the EU of its intention to leave
the union in March 2017 and, as of November 2019, the UK remains part of the EU. However, the
leave vote did affect expectations about the UK’s economic future. The shift in expectations had
two components. First, there was an increase in uncertainty over the future of UK economic policy
and trade agreements (Bloom et al. 2018). Second, the referendum led to a decline in the expected
future openness of the UK to trade and immigration with the EU.
Because economic behavior is forward looking, these changes in expectations had an immedi-
ate impact on financial markets. On 24 June 2016, after the result was known, the FTSE 100 stock
market index fell by 3.8 percent and sterling depreciated by 8.1 percent against the US dollar and
5.8 percent against the euro.5 Stock prices soon recovered, supported by the Bank of England’s
decision in August 2016 to cut interest rates by 25 basis points and undertake renewed quantitative
easing. But the fall in sterling proved to be persistent. Figure 1 shows the import-weighted effec-
tive UK exchange rate at daily frequency from the start of 2016 until the middle of 2017.6 In the
week after the referendum the effective exchange rate depreciated by 9.2 percent and it fluctuated
around 10 percent below its pre-referendum value over the following two years.
5Breinlich et al. (2018) and Davies and Studnicka (2018) analyze share price movements in the days after the
referendum.
6See Section 4.2 for a description of how the exchange rate index is constructed.
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Figure 1: The depreciation of sterling after the 2016 referendum
Notes: Import-weighted effective exchange rate index calculated using daily data
and normalized to 100 on the day of the referendum (23 June 2016, indicated by
the vertical line). An increase in the exchange rate corresponds to a depreciation
of sterling.
We use the Brexit depreciation to estimate the relationship between the value of sterling and
consumer prices. The Brexit depreciation has several features that make it attractive for this pur-
pose. Not only was it unanticipated, but it is a rare example of a sudden, large, persistent shock to
a major currency. Moreover, the depreciation was caused by the UK’s decision to change future
policy, not by a shock to domestic or foreign economic conditions. This feature of the deprecia-
tion simplifies, though does not eliminate, the identification challenge that arises when estimating
exchange rate pass-through using exchange rate movements caused by supply and demand shocks
that themselves affect equilibrium prices.
A challenge in using the Brexit depreciation for identification is that the referendum may have
affected prices through channels other than the fall in sterling. For example, through the Bank of
England’s decision to loosen monetary policy after the vote, or through changes in consumer and
firm behaviour in anticipation of Brexit. As explained in detail below, we address this challenge
by using the share of imports in consumer expenditure to measure products’ exposure to exchange
rate movements. Our identifying assumption is that, conditional on the exchange rate, price effects
of the leave vote are uncorrelated with pre-referendum import share variation across products.
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3 Import costs and consumer prices
To inform our empirical analysis we develop a model of how exchange rate movements affect con-
sumer prices through changes in import costs. The model builds upon elements from Burstein,
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005), Goldberg and Campa (2010) and Berlingieri, Breinlich and Dhin-
gra (2018). Consumers purchase both domestic and foreign goods, which come bundled with
locally produced distribution services that capture the cost of bringing goods to market. Produc-
ers use both domestic and imported inputs and we take input-output linkages between sectors into
account when modelling intermediate input use.
3.1 Consumption and production
Suppose consumers purchase a basket of G product groups indexed by g. Within each product
group, consumers purchase a domestic good Dg, an imported good Mg and distribution services
Sg. The consumption aggregate Cg for group g is given by:
Cg =
(
Mγgg D
1−γg
g
)1−λg
Sλgg , (1)
where λg gives the share of distribution services in expenditure on group g and γg gives the share
of imports in expenditure net of distribution costs.7
Production of domestic good g uses a bundle vg of primary factors (e.g. labour and capital)
together with aggregates of domestic and imported intermediate inputs. Output Yg is given by:
Yg = φg
(
X
δg
MgX
1−δg
Dg
)αg
v1−αgg , (2)
where φg denotes the productivity of sector g, XMg denotes imported intermediate usage and XDg
denotes domestic intermediate usage. Here αg is the share of intermediate inputs in production
costs and δg is the share of imports in intermediate input costs.
The imported intermediate bundle used by domestic producers in sector g is an aggregate of
imports of all G product groups:
XMg =
G∏
j=1
x
µgj
Mgj, (3)
where xMgj denotes the quantity of imported good j used to produce the sector g imported inter-
mediate input and µgj gives the cost share of j in imported intermediate expenditure by sector g.
Likewise, the domestic intermediate bundle is an aggregate of all G domestic goods:
7Corsetti and Dedola (2005) consider an alternative specification of distribution services in which distribution costs
are additive.
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XDg =
G∏
j=1
x
ψgj
Dgj, (4)
where xDgj denotes the quantity of domestic good j used to produce the sector g domestic inter-
mediate input and ψgj gives the cost share of j in domestic intermediate expenditure by sector
g.
Lastly, we assume that distribution services are produced by the domestic wholesale and retail
sectors according to:
Sg = X
ξ
WgX
1−ξ
Rg , (5)
where XWg denotes wholesale output used in sector g and XRg is retail output. The share of
distribution services expenditure spent on wholesale is ξ, while the expenditure share of retail
is 1 − ξ. Since ξ does not vary with g, distribution services are homogeneous and the price of
distribution services will be constant across product groups.8 The production technologies for
wholesale and retail goods have the same structure as for all other goods and are given by equations
(2)-(4) with g = W for wholesale and g = R for retail.
3.2 Prices
We solve for consumption and intermediate good prices under the assumption that all markets
are competitive. Let pS be the price of distribution services, pMg be the price of imported good g
and pDg be the price of domestic good g. Cost minimization using equation (1) implies that the
consumption price index pCg for product group g is:
pCg =

 1
1− λg
(
pMg
γg
)γg (
pDg
1− γg
)1−γg
1−λg (
pS
λg
)λg
.
Distribution services introduce a wedge between basic prices (obtained by letting λg → 0 in the
expression above) and the purchasers’ prices paid by consumers. Purchasers’ prices may also
depend upon the level of taxes and subsidies on products. Although we do not model taxes and
subsidies explicitly, we adjust for their presence when mapping the model to consumer expenditure
data.
We are interested in how consumer prices change over time following an exchange rate move-
ment. For any variable z let zˆ be the log difference of z between period t and the previous period:
8In principle, ξ could vary by product group, but in our data we do not observe wholesale and retail expenditure
shares at the product group level.
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zˆ ≡ log zt − log zt−1. Then we can write the change in the group g price index as:
pˆCg = (1− λg)γgpˆ
M
g + (1− λg)(1− γg)pˆ
D
g + λgpˆ
S. (6)
This expression allows us to decompose the impact of a change in import costs on consumer prices
into direct and indirect effects. The direct effect is given by the first term on the right hand side of
(6), which shows that higher import prices feed into consumer prices directly through consumer
expenditure on imported goods. The magnitude of the direct effect is determined by the share of
imports in consumer expenditure (1− λg)γg.
In addition, import costs may affect consumer prices indirectly through their impact on the
domestic good price pDg and the price of distribution services p
S . The second and third terms on the
right hand side of (6) capture this indirect effect. The magnitude of the indirect effect depends upon
the extent to which imports are used in domestic production and the share of domestic production
in consumer expenditure.
To calculate the indirect effect we use (2)-(4) to analyze how changes in import costs affect
domestic prices. From (2), assuming constant productivity and factor prices, cost minimization by
domestic producers yields:
pˆDg = αgδgpˆ
X
Mg + αg(1− δg)pˆ
X
Dg, (7)
where pXMg and p
X
Dg denote the prices of the imported and domestic intermediate input bundles,
respectively. Using (3) and (4) we can write changes in the prices of these intermediate bundles as:
pˆXMg =
G∑
j=1
µgj pˆ
M
j , pˆ
X
Dg =
G∑
j=1
ψgj pˆ
D
j ,
and substituting these expressions into (7) yields:
pˆDg = αgδg
G∑
j=1
µgj pˆ
M
j + αg(1− δg)
G∑
j=1
ψgj pˆ
D
j .
Since we have G such equations (one per product group), we can solve the linear system to obtain
domestic price changes in terms of import cost variation. This gives:
PˆD = (I − ΩD)−1ΩM PˆM , (8)
where PˆD is the G × 1 vector of domestic price changes pˆDg , Pˆ
M is the vector of import price
changes pˆMg , Ω
D is a G × G matrix with elements ωDgj = αg(1 − δg)ψgj where g denotes the row
and j the column, ΩM is a G×G matrix with elements ωMgj = αgδgµgj and I is the G×G identity
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matrix.
Recall that equations (2)-(4) with g = W and g = R define the production technologies for
wholesale and retail, respectively. Consequently, we also obtain from (8) the effect of import prices
on domestic wholesale and retail prices. Using (5) we can then write the change in the price of
distribution services as:
pˆS = ξpˆDW + (1− ξ)pˆ
D
R , (9)
where pDW denotes the price of wholesale services and p
D
R the retail price. Finally, substituting (8)
and (9) back into equation (6) allows us to express the indirect effect in terms of changes in import
costs.
3.3 Import share
We are interested in how consumer prices respond to exchange rate movements. Suppose an ex-
change rate depreciation causes all import prices to increase by the same proportion pˆMg = eˆ for all
g = 1, . . . , G where eˆ is the magnitude of the depreciation. In this case, combining equations (6),
(8) and (9) implies that the change in the group g price index is:
pˆCg =
[
(1− λg)γg + (1− λg)(1− γg)
G∑
j=1
θgj + λg
(
ξ
G∑
j=1
θWj + (1− ξ)
G∑
j=1
θRj
)]
eˆ, (10)
where θgj denotes the element in row g and column j of the G × G matrix (I − Ω
D)−1ΩM that
appears in equation (8).
The term in square brackets on the right hand side of (10) gives the elasticity of consumer
prices to the exchange rate. We will call this elasticity the import share of group g (denoted
as ImportShareg) since it equals the cost share of imports in domestic consumer expenditure
on product group g, accounting for both direct import consumption and indirect consumption of
imports embodied in domestically produced goods and distribution services. The expenditure share
of directly consumed imports equals (1− λg)γg, which we label the direct import share, while the
remaining terms represent the indirect import share. Of course, the total import share is the sum
of the direct and indirect shares.
The import share is determined by the consumption and production function parameters de-
fined in equations (1)-(5). Because these parameters govern consumers’ expenditure shares and
producers’ cost shares, they can be calculated from input-output tables, which implies that the im-
port share is observable for each product group g. Consequently, we use equation (10) as the basis
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of our empirical analysis. The model predicts that products with larger import shares will experi-
ence faster inflation following an exchange rate depreciation. In Section 5 we test this prediction in
an event study framework by regressing changes in inflation rates following the Brexit referendum
on import shares at the product group level.
In Section 6 we use equation (10) to estimate exchange rate pass-through. This is a two-step
process. First, we regress pˆCg on ImportShareg interacted with the exchange rate movement
eˆ to estimate the elasticity of product group prices to the exchange rate conditional on import
shares. We will refer to this elasticity as import cost pass-through since it gives the pass-through
of exchange rate movements to consumer prices conditional on import shares. Our model predicts
that import cost pass-through equals one, i.e., there is complete import cost pass-through. Second,
we aggregate across product groups to obtain an estimate of pass-through to the consumer price
index pC . Suppose import cost pass-through equals β and ηg is the share of product group g in
consumer expenditure. Then equation (10) implies:
pˆC
eˆ
= β
G∑
g=1
ηg × ImportShareg. (11)
The ratio pˆC/eˆ is the elasticity of consumer prices to the exchange rate, which equals aggregate
exchange rate pass-through.
3.4 Discussion
Our model provides a simple framework for understanding how exchange rate movements affect
consumer prices. Like any model it involves a number of useful abstractions. Two are worth
highlighting at this stage.
First, we assume that the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and imported good
within each product group, and between alternative inputs to production, is unity. This implies
that the expenditure and cost shares are fixed by the model’s technological parameters and are
insensitive to price changes. For example, the share of distribution services in consumer expen-
diture is always λg. Relaxing this assumption and allowing for constant elasticity of substitution
consumption and production functions with an elasticity other than one would not change how we
implement the model empirically.
To see why, note that the price change equations (6)-(10) would continue to hold locally in the
generalized model provided the coefficients, such as λg and γg, were interpreted as equilibrium
cost and expenditure shares rather than underlying technology parameters. It follows that the local
elasticity of consumer prices to the exchange rate would still be given by the import share in
equation (10). Since our empirical import share measure does not vary over time (see Section 4.1
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for details), this implies that the mapping we use to calculate the import share from observable
input-output data would be unchanged in the generalized model.
Allowing for non-unitary elasticities of substitution would affect how prices are aggregated
into product group price indices. However, because we observe prices at the product group level
we do not undertake any such aggregation. We do aggregate across product groups using equation
(11) to convert estimated import cost pass-through into a measure of aggregate exchange rate
pass-through. Section 5.5 provides evidence that supports using constant expenditure shares to
aggregate across product groups.
The second point to highlight is that the model assumes perfect competition. Consequently,
exchange rate changes pass through one-to-one into import prices and import price changes pass
through one-to-one into the prices consumers and producers pay for imported goods. One-to-one
pass-through is the key condition that implies equation (10) holds and there is complete import
cost pass-through. Departing from perfect competition by allowing producers to charge a constant
mark-up over marginal costs would affect price levels, but with constant mark-ups there would
still be complete import cost pass-through and the price change equations (6)-(10) would not be
affected.
However, complete import cost pass-through does not hold in an environment with variable
mark-ups. Suppose, for example, that producers face downward sloping demand elasticities as
found by Berman, Martin and Mayer (2012). In this case, an increase in import costs would lead
to a reduction in mark-ups implying less than complete pass-through. Similarly, if there are nom-
inal price rigidities then pass-through depends upon the currency in which prices are set and the
frequency of price adjustment (Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon 2010). Although we do not ex-
plicitly model variable mark-ups or sticky prices, we will use our results to compare estimated
import cost pass-through with the model’s prediction that pass-through equals one. This com-
parison will shed light on the extent to which allowing for incomplete pass-through of exchange
rate changes to import costs is important for understanding consumer price changes following the
Brexit depreciation.
4 Data
This section provides a brief overview of the data used in the empirical analysis, focusing on
the calculation of import shares. A complete description of the data used and how variables are
constructed is given in Appendix A.
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4.1 Import shares measure
Consumer prices are reported using the Classification of Individual Consumption According to
Purpose (COICOP). We work with product groups defined at the level of COICOP classes, which
is the most disaggregated level for which import shares can be calculated using UK input-output
tables. The full list of COICOP classes we use is given in Appendix A. Examples include Bread
and cereals, Wine, Electricity, Pharmaceutical products, and Restaurants and cafes.
The import share of class g is defined in equation (10). Other than λg, all the parameters needed
to calculate import shares can be inferred from the UK Input-Output Analytical Tables published
by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). We use the 2013 tables and take advantage of the fact
that the ONS publishes separate tables for domestically produced and imported products. Using
2013 data means that the import shares are time-invariant and pre-determined with respect to the
Brexit referendum, which ensures our estimates do not suffer from endogeneity bias that could
arise if inflation rates are correlated with changes in import shares.
The parameter λg is given by the expenditure share of distribution services. To calculate λg
we need to adjust consumer expenditure at purchasers’ prices reported in the input-output tables to
account for net product taxes. We do this using the UK Supply and Use Tables for 2013 from the
ONS, which include product-level data on expenditure on taxes less subsidies. See Appendix A.1
for further details of how the import share parameters are calculated.
The Input-Output Analytical Tables and the Supply and Use Tables report data using the Clas-
sification of Products by Activity (CPA) for 105 products. Consequently, we first compute import
shares for the 105 CPA products and then use a concordance provided by the ONS to map CPA
products to COICOP classes. This enables us to calculate import shares for 84 COICOP classes.9
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the import share variable. We report the average import
share for classes in each of the twelve divisions of the COICOP classification. Column (1) gives
the direct import share, column (2) the indirect import share and column (3) the total import share.
There is substantial variation in import shares across divisions. Total import shares range from 5
percent in Education to 49 percent in Clothing and footwear. Unsurprisingly, tradable goods such
as food and drinks have higher import shares than services such as restaurants and utilities. But
even services have positive total import shares because services firms use imported intermediate
inputs. For example, the Restaurants and hotels division has a zero direct import share but an
indirect import share of 17 percent.10
The import share of aggregate consumption equals the weighted average of the class-level
9The ONS publishes consumer price data for 85 COICOP classes. Our method does not given an the import share
for Second-hand cars, which we drop from the empirical analysis.
10Table A1 in the appendix lists the import share for each of the 84 COICOP classes and shows that there is
considerable variation in import shares within divisions.
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import shares, where the weight of each class g is given by its share in consumer expenditure
ηg. We use expenditure shares for the year 2016 reported by the ONS. Table 1 reports that the
aggregate import share is 29 percent, which is fairly evenly divided between direct and indirect
imports with 16 percent and 14 percent, respectively. This illustrates the importance of accounting
for indirect import consumption when measuring exposure to import costs.
4.2 Other variables
To measure inflation we use UK consumer price indices (CPIs) by COICOP class from the ONS
(dataset MM23). As additional price outcomes, we collect from the ONS producer price indices
(PPIs) that we match to 42 CPA sectors (mainly manufacturing industries) and an import price
index for intermediate inputs (dataset MM22). For data on household expenditure patterns we use
the ONS Living Costs and Food Survey. We also obtain wage growth data from the ONS Average
Weekly Earnings dataset.
In order to estimate exchange rate pass-through, we construct an effective exchange rate index
for the UK. The index e is calculated as a weighted average of log differences in bilateral exchange
rates. An increase in e corresponds to a depreciation of sterling. The weights are given by the
share of UK imports by trading partner calculated using UN Comtrade data for 2013. We obtain
period average bilateral exchange rates for 169 countries from the International Monetary Fund’s
International Financial Statistics database and Thompson Reuters. We calculate effective exchange
rate indices at daily, monthly and quarterly frequencies.
Finally, there are two additional variables that will be used as controls in our empirical analysis.
The first is inflation in the Euro area. We obtain the consumer price index for each COICOP class
in the Euro area from the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) provided by Eurostat.
This cross-country aggregate is computed from the HICP of the 19 Euro area countries. For the
UK, the HICP is the same as the CPI produced by the ONS. We also obtain Euro area PPIs from
Eurostat for NACE Revision 2 sectors, which map directly into CPA sectors.
Second, we use data on oil prices in US dollars from the IMF Commodity Prices database,
together with the UK Input-Output Analytical Tables for 2013, to construct a variable Oilgt that
captures the effect of oil price changes on intermediate input costs by COICOP class in the UK.
The oil price variable is an interaction of the share of consumer expenditure on class g that is
(indirectly) spent on imported oil with changes in the US dollar price of oil (see Appendix A for
details). Conditional on the oil price change, classes where production is more oil intensive have a
higher value of Oilgt.
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5 Event study
This section undertakes an event study analysis of how the sterling depreciation following the
Brexit referendum affected prices in the UK. Section 6 then uses the period around the Brexit vote
to estimate exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices.
5.1 Descriptive evidence
Before turning to regressions, we present some descriptive evidence on how the post-Brexit depre-
ciation affected UK prices. Figure 2 plots the evolution of intermediate input import prices and
our effective exchange rate index from 2015 to 2018. Import prices rose sharply following the
referendum and by mid-2017 the import price index was approximately 10 percent higher than at
the time of the vote, while sterling depreciated by around 10 percent over the same period. These
movements are consistent with complete pass-through from the post-referendum depreciation to
import prices.
Figure 2: Intermediate input import prices and the value of sterling, 2015-2018
Notes: Monthly data. The indices are normalized to 100 at the time of the refer-
endum (June 2016, indicated by the vertical line). An increase in the exchange
rate index corresponds to a depreciation of sterling.
Looking at consumer prices, Figure 3 shows the aggregate CPI in the UK and the Euro area
from 2015 to the middle of 2018. Both indices are normalized to 100 at the time of the referendum
in June 2016. We see that following the vote prices rose more quickly in the UK than the Euro area,
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which is suggestive evidence that the depreciation of sterling increased UK inflation. Between June
2016 and June 2018 UK prices increased by 1.9 percentage points more than prices in the Euro
area.
Figure 3: Consumer prices in the UK and the Euro area, 2015-18
Notes: Monthly data. The indices are normalized to 100 at the time of the refer-
endum (June 2016, indicated by the vertical line).
Figure 4 provides a more detailed look at what drove these price changes. For both the UK and
the Euro area, the figure shows how inflation changed following the referendum for high import
share COICOP classes compared to low import share classes. Classes are divided into high and
low import share groups depending on whether their import share is above or below the median
import share. The dark solid line is the average inflation rate in the UK for high import share
classes, while the dark dashed line is average UK inflation for low import share classes. The grey
lines provide the same data for the Euro area. Inflation is defined as the log difference in prices
over the previous year and is normalized to zero in June 2016 for all groups.
We see that following the referendum there is a sharp increase in UK inflation among high
import share classes and that inflation remains high throughout 2017 before starting to decline in
2018. However, there is no comparable trend for low import share classes in the UK or for either
group in the Euro area. This suggests that the referendum increased inflation in the UK by raising
the cost of products with high import shares. To formally test this hypothesis, we now introduce
our empirical model.
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Figure 4: Inflation rates in the UK and Euro area by import shares, 2015-2018
Notes: COICOP classes with above median import shares are allocated to the
high import share group and those with below median import shares to the low
import share group. For each of the four groups, inflation is expressed as the
average log consumer price difference over the previous 12 months relative to
the average group inflation rate in June 2016. Monthly data. The vertical line
indicates the referendum date (June 2016).
5.2 Event study specification
We estimate an event study model that, motivated by our theoretical framework, exploits variation
in import shares across COICOP classes. The baseline specification is:
Inflationgt = χPostt × ImportShareg + Zgt + νg + νt + εgt. (12)
The dependent variable Inflationgt is the inflation rate (i.e., the log change in the price index
from the previous period) for a given COICOP class g in period t. Postt is a dummy variable that
takes the value one for all periods after the referendum and zero otherwise. ImportShareg is our
measure of the cost share of imports in consumer expenditure on class g as described in Sections
3.3 and 4.1.
Zgt is a vector of additional variables that may affect inflation at the class level. Specifically,
we include in Zgt Euro area inflation for class g in period t and the oil price exposure variableOilgt
described in Section 4.2. Euro area inflation is a proxy for inflationary pressures that differ across
classes, but are not UK specific, whileOilgt controls for the effect of changes in oil prices. We also
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include COICOP class fixed effects and period fixed effects. The former control for time invariant
differences in inflation across classes, while the latter capture changes in aggregate inflationary
pressures over time. Any price effects of the leave vote that are uncorrelated with ImportShareg
will be captured by the period fixed effects. Finally, the error term is εgt.
The coefficient of interest is the Postt × ImportShareg interaction effect χ, which is a
differences-in-differences estimate of how inflation changes after the referendum varied across
classes with different import shares. A positive estimate of χ implies that the increase in infla-
tion following the referendum was greater for classes where the cost share of imports in consumer
expenditure ImportShareg is higher.
We estimate specification (12) using a sample from June 2014 to June 2018, and we define a
period to be either one year or two years long. Since the referendum occurred on 23 June 2016,
we define the two-year periods to be June 2014 to June 2016 and June 2016 to June 2018, while
the one-year periods are defined to end in June of each year. We choose the sample to include a
two-year window after the referendum because the exchange rate pass-through literature usually
allows up to two years for exchange rate movements to feed through to consumer prices (Burstein
and Gopinath 2014), a finding we confirm in our pass-through estimates in Section 6 below. Table
2 shows descriptive statistics for the time-varying estimation variables. The statistics in panel A
are calculated using two-year periods, while those in panel B use one-year periods.
5.3 Consumer prices
We start by estimating specification (12) using two-year periods with CPI inflation as the dependent
variable. Table 3 presents the results. All columns include COICOP class and period fixed effects,
although in column (1) we do not use any other controls. The estimated import share interaction
effect is positive and significant at the ten percent level. In column (2) we add Oilgt to control for
oil price changes. The oil price effect is positive though imprecisely estimated. More importantly,
controlling for Oilgt reduces the estimate of χ. However, the standard error of the estimate also
falls and its statistical significance actually increases.
Our preferred specification is in column (3) where we also control for Euro area inflation,
which, as expected, has a positive association with UK inflation. The estimated coefficient on the
import share interaction in column (3) is 0.211 and is significant at the one percent level. This
confirms that, following the referendum, classes with higher import shares experienced larger rises
in inflation. The magnitude of the estimate implies that for each ten percentage point rise in the
import share, prices in the two years following the referendum increased by 2.1 log points, or about
2.1 percentage points.11
11We have also experimented with controlling for inflation in France, Germany and the US instead of Euro area
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It is possible that the depreciation of sterling following the Brexit vote directly affected Euro
area inflation. Therefore, in column (4) we include the difference between UK and Euro area
inflation by COICOP class as our dependent variable. The estimated import share interaction
effect is statistically indistinguishable from column (3). In sum, products with higher exposure to
import costs saw greater increases in consumer prices following the referendum.
Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (12) using one-year periods. The specifi-
cations in columns (1)-(4) are the same as those in the corresponding columns of Table 3. Our
preferred specification is again in column (3) where we control for both oil price changes and Euro
area inflation. The coefficient on the import share interaction term stands at 0.110. Since this is
roughly half the value estimated using two-year periods, it is both qualitatively and quantitatively
consistent with our earlier results.
In column (5) of Table 4 we interact the import share measure with annual dummies as opposed
to the post-referendum indicator. The 2016 dummy takes the value one for the year ending in June
2016, and the 2017 and 2018 dummies are analogously defined (the reference period is the year up
to June 2015). This specification allows us to estimate how the post-referendum effect varies over
time and to test for pre-trends in the year before the referendum. We estimate positive import share
interaction effects for both 2017 and 2018, and the estimated coefficients have similar magnitudes.
This implies that the increase in inflation among classes with higher import shares that occurred
after the referendum did not subside after the first year but continued through June 2018. This
finding is consistent with the literature on the timing of exchange rate pass-through into import
and consumer prices (see Burstein and Gopinath 2014). Reassuringly, we also find no evidence of
pre-trends in the data. The estimated import share interaction effect for 2016 is close to zero and
statistically insignificant, implying that classes with higher import shares did not witness greater
inflation increases in the year before the vote.
Our import share variable measures the import cost share at purchasers’ prices. As discussed in
Section 4.1, the expenditure share on distribution services λg is not reported in the UK input-output
tables, and to calculate import shares at purchasers’ prices we estimate λg indirectly using the UK
Supply and Use Tables. Therefore, as an additional robustness check, we also report results when
import shares are measured at basic prices. Basic prices do not include distribution services nor
net product taxes. In our theory this corresponds to letting λg → 0. Table 5 presents the same set
of two-year period specifications estimated in Table 3, except that ImportShareg is defined as the
share of imports in consumer expenditure at basic prices. Again, we find that classes with higher
import shares experienced greater increases in inflation after the Brexit vote.12
inflation. We obtain very similar estimates.
12The import share interaction coefficient is smaller when the basic price measure is used because not accounting
for distribution services overestimates variation in import shares across classes. The overestimation results from the
expenditure share of distribution services being relatively high (average λg = 0.28) and positively correlated with the
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5.4 Producer prices
To shed further light on the price effects of the Brexit referendum, we also analyze producer prices.
We have PPI data for 42 CPA sectors. The producer price of sector g corresponds to the domes-
tic good price pDg in our model, meaning that producer price inflation is given by equation (8).
Therefore, if we define ProducerImportShareg =
∑J
j=1 θgj to be the share of imported inputs
in domestic production costs for sector g, we have:
pˆDg = ProducerImportShareg × eˆ.
Motivated by this expression, we estimate the event study specification (12) with PPI inflation
as the dependent variable and the Postt dummy interacted with ProducerImportShareg on the
right hand side. In this case the oil price exposure variable is measured at the CPA sector level,
and we control for PPI inflation in the Euro area.
Table 6 presents the producer price regression results using two-year periods. Although the es-
timates are less precise than for consumer prices, we find strong evidence that the producer import
share interaction effect is positive. This implies that sectors where imported intermediate inputs
account for a greater share of production costs experienced larger increases in inflation following
the referendum. These estimates support Goldberg and Campa’s (2010) argument that the effect
of exchange rate movements on consumer prices depends not only on the direct import share of
consumer expenditure, but also on indirect import consumption through consumer purchases of
goods produced domestically using imported inputs. Recall from Table 1 that the import share of
aggregate UK consumer expenditure is almost evenly divided between direct and indirect imports.
It follows that failing to account for indirect import consumption would severely understate the
exposure of consumer prices to import costs.
We also use the producer price specification to look for evidence of strategic complementari-
ties in domestic price setting. In our theoretical framework prices are competitively determined,
meaning that domestic producer prices pDg are unaffected by the price of sector g imports p
M
g after
controlling for indirect import use. However, in models with strategic complementarities in price
setting, producer prices also depend on the prices of competing goods, such as imports of the same
product group.13 Since imports became more expensive following the referendum, strategic com-
plementarity in pricing would lead domestic producer prices to rise by more in sectors where the
share of imports in expenditure at basic prices γg is higher. Auer, Burstein and Lein (2018) find
evidence consistent with such behavior following the 2015 appreciation of the Swiss franc.
To test for strategic complementarities, we estimate producer price regressions analogous to
basic price import share (correlation 0.83), together with distribution services having a low import share of 0.13.
13See Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2019) for firm-level evidence of strategic complementarities in Belgian manu-
facturing.
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those reported in Table 6, but we also include the interaction of the Postt dummy with the direct
import share at basic prices γg on the right hand side. This interaction is a proxy for the change
in competitors’ prices following the referendum and, if there are strategic complementarities in
pricing, we expect the interaction to have a positive effect on domestic producer prices. The results
are shown in Table 7. In columns (1)-(3) we also control for the Postt×ProducerImportShareg
interaction used in Table 6, while in columns (4)-(6) we drop this interaction. In all cases the
estimated effect of the direct import share at basic prices interaction term is close to zero and
statistically insignificant. Therefore, we do not find evidence of strategic complementarities in
price setting following the Brexit referendum. However, we caution that our results do not rule out
the existence of strategic complementarities at more disaggregated levels.
5.5 Consumer expenditure
How did the increase in prices following the referendum affect consumer expenditure patterns?
To address this question we estimate the event study specification (12) using data on the share
of consumer expenditure by COICOP class. We obtain consumer expenditure for 75 COICOP
classes from the Living Costs and Food Survey and use the log difference of expenditure shares
over two-year periods as the dependent variable.14
The results of estimating the consumer expenditure regressions are shown in Table 8. Re-
gardless of whether or not the Oil and Euro area inflation controls are included, we estimate that
the import share interaction term is uncorrelated with changes in consumer expenditure. These
estimates are consistent with consumer demand having a unit elasticity of substitution between
COICOP classes. Consequently, they provide a rationale for using constant expenditure shares to
aggregate price changes across classes when estimating the aggregate impact of the Brexit depreci-
ation on consumer prices, as we do in Section 7.1. They also imply that real consumer expenditure
growth in the two years after the referendum was lower for classes with higher import shares,
suggesting that the Brexit depreciation reduced real consumption growth.
6 Exchange rate pass-through
We have shown that the Brexit vote led to faster price increases for products with higher import
shares. Building upon this finding, we now use changes in the value of sterling around the time
of the referendum to estimate exchange rate pass-through into consumer prices. To do this, we
14During our sample the Living Costs and Food Survey switched from collecting data on a calendar year basis to
using the UK financial year, which ends in March (e.g. the 2015 survey covers April 2015 to March 2016). For the
pre period we use the difference between the 2013 calendar year survey and the 2015 financial year survey, while for
the post period we use the difference between the 2015 and 2017 financial year surveys.
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modify our estimation equation to control for observed exchange rate movements both before and
after the referendum. Specifically, we estimate a distributed lag version of equation (10) given by:
Inflationgt =
T∑
s=0
βsImportShareg × eˆt−s + Zgt + νgq + νt + εgt, (13)
where eˆ is the log difference in the sterling effective exchange rate index. This specification al-
lows for the effect of exchange rate movements on consumer prices to take up to T quarters and,
consistent with the theoretical model, assumes the elasticity of consumer prices to the exchange
rate varies across classes with different import shares. Consequently, estimating this equation
gives what we defined in Section 3.3 as import cost pass-through. Our estimate of import cost
pass-through β equals the sum of the coefficients of all the ImportShare times exchange rate
interaction terms, β =
∑T
s=0 βs. Recall that the theory features complete import cost pass-through
implying β = 1. Having obtained β, we can use equation (11) to aggregate across COICOP classes
and estimate aggregate exchange rate pass-through.
We estimate equation (13) using quarterly data from 2011Q1 to 2018Q2 with CPI inflation by
COICOP class as the dependent variable. As in the event study, we control for Euro area inflation
and exposure to oil price changes. We also include quarter fixed effects νt and class-season fixed
effects νgq, where the seasons q are the four quarters of the year. That is, we include four fixed
effects per COICOP class, each of which turns on in a different quarter. The class-season effects
control for seasonal variation in product-specific inflation rates. The identifying assumption is that
changes in inflation captured by the error term εgt that are correlated with the timing of exchange
rate movements are uncorrelated with import share variation across classes.
Panel C of Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the estimation variables at quarterly fre-
quency and Table 9 presents the regression results. For each regression we report estimated import
cost pass-through β =
∑T
s=0 βs. In column (1) we include four exchange rate lags and estimate that
import cost pass-through equals 0.82. This estimate is statistically different from zero, confirm-
ing that exchange rate depreciations lead to higher inflation in classes with higher import shares.
However, it is insignificantly different from one, implying that we cannot reject the hypothesis of
complete import cost pass-through.
In columns (2)-(5) we add additional exchange rate lags going from five lags in column (2)
up to eight lags in column (5). Although the point estimate of import cost pass-through varies
somewhat across specifications, it is always positive and significant, but not statistically different
from one. Therefore, the evidence in Table 9 is consistent with complete import cost pass-through
to consumer prices in the period around the Brexit referendum. However, neither can we rule out
the possibility that import cost pass-through is high, but below 100 percent.
Much of the pass-through literature estimates incomplete pass-through to border prices and
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import costs (Burstein and Gopinath 2014). But there are notable exceptions. For example, the set
of large devaluation episodes analyzed by Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005) are associated
with complete pass-through into import prices and recent work has found evidence of complete
pass-through to import prices following President Trump’s tariff increases (Amiti, Redding and
Weinstein 2019; Fajgelbaum, Goldberg, Kennedy and Khandelwal 2019). Our findings provide
further evidence that large, salient shocks such as the Brexit vote are associated with high levels of
exchange rate pass-through.
With complete import cost pass-through, using equation (11) to weight import shares across
classes implies that pass-through to the aggregate consumer price index equals 0.29, which is the
import share of aggregate consumption reported in Table 1. This is our preferred estimate of
exchange rate pass-through in our sample.
We have estimated pass-through using a two-step process that accounts for heterogeneity in
import shares across classes. By contrast, pass-through is usually estimated by regressing price
changes on exchange rate movements (and controls) without including import share interactions.
For comparison, Table 10 reports the results from estimating a conventional pass-through specifi-
cation using our sample. In particular, we estimate a modified version of equation (13) where the
exchange rate terms are not interacted with import shares. We also drop the quarter fixed effects as
they are collinear with the exchange rate movements. In this case, estimated exchange rate pass-
through to consumer prices is around 0.15 and is not sensitive to the number of lags included. This
result is consistent with existing estimates of pass-through in the UK that do not control for import
share differences across classes (Goldberg and Campa 2010; Burstein and Gopinath 2014; Forbes,
Hjortsoe and Nenova 2018).
Our preferred pass-through estimate is roughly twice as large as the estimates of around 0.15
reported in Table 10. This difference illustrates the advantage of allowing for exchange rate expo-
sure to vary across product groups when estimating consumer price pass-through. Formally, not
including the import share interaction terms in specification (13) can generate heterogeneity bias if
import shares are correlated with consumer expenditure shares, and omitted variable bias from not
including time fixed effects. In our data the correlation between import shares and expenditures
shares is −0.09, which generates a negligible heterogeneity bias. Instead, negative correlation be-
tween the quarter fixed effects and exchange rate changes is responsible for the downwards bias
evident in Table 10.
7 Cost of living
In this section we use the empirical results reported above to provide indicative estimates of how
Brexit has affected the cost of living and real wages in the UK. We consider both aggregate ef-
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fects and distributional consequences across households with different expenditure patterns. The
analysis sheds light on the welfare effects of exchange rate movements and on how the referendum
has affected UK living standards prior to Brexit occurring. However, because our identification
strategy isolates price changes driven by the exchange rate, the results only capture the effects of
the referendum that operate through the depreciation of sterling. Any independent effects of Brexit
on prices, for example due to monetary policy easing by the Bank of England or domestic demand
and supply shocks, are outside the scope of our analysis.
Throughout this section we assume that, consistent with the estimates in Table 9, there is com-
plete import cost pass-through. We also assume that the referendum led to a 10 percent depreciation
of sterling. As shown in Figure 1, the effective sterling exchange rate depreciated by around 10
percent immediately following the vote. There was also a more modest and gradual depreciation in
the first half of 2016. To the extent that this pre-referendum depreciation was driven by uncertainty
regarding the outcome of the vote, our analysis will underestimate the magnitude of the Brexit
depreciation and the resulting price rises.
7.1 Aggregate effects
Combining a 10 percent fall in the value of sterling with pass-through of 0.29 implies the Brexit
depreciation increased the UK consumer price index by around 2.9 percent by June 2018. This
calculation holds the expenditure weight for each COICOP class fixed at 2016 levels. However,
using 2018 weights instead also delivers an estimated effect of 2.9 percent, as the weights vary
little over time and the correlation between the 2016 and 2018 weights is 0.99. Comparing our
estimate to the approximately 2 percentage point gap between UK and Euro area inflation in the
two years after the referendum shown in Figure 3 implies that inflationary pressures not linked to
the exchange rate were more muted in the UK than the Euro area following the referendum.
A 2.9 percent price rise is equivalent to a £870 per year increase in the cost of living for the
average household. In aggregate, this corresponds to £23.5 billion per year additional expenditure
for the UK, or £450 million per week.15
Figure 5 shows nominal and real wage growth before and after the referendum. There is no
evidence of a trend break in nominal wage growth around the time of the referendum, while real
wage growth declined sharply and became negative in 2017. Costa, Dhingra and Machin (2019)
estimate that, if anything, the depreciation of sterling following the referendum reduced nominal
wage growth. Based on this evidence, we conclude that the 2.9 percent increase in consumer prices
caused by the fall in sterling led to a decline in real wage growth of a similar magnitude. Thus, by
June 2018 the average UK household had to spend around 1.4 additional weeks’ wages to afford
15Average annual UK household expenditure in 2018 was £29,900 and there were 27.2 million households.
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the same consumption basket. Through this channel the Brexit vote delivered a swift negative
shock to UK living standards.
Figure 5: Wage growth in the UK, 2015-18
Notes: Wage growth is the percentage change year on year in the three-month average of Average
Weekly Earnings - Total Pay. Series KAC3 for nominal wages, A3WW for real wages. The
vertical line indicates the referendum date (June 2016).
7.2 Distributional consequences
We have shown that the referendum led to larger price increases for COICOP classes with higher
import shares. Consequently, households that spend relatively more on classes with greater import
shares faced larger cost of living increases. To shed light on the magnitude of this distributional
effect of the Brexit depreciation, we use data on the composition of household expenditure from
the ONS Living Costs and Food Survey for the financial year ending March 2016.
We start by computing the expenditure share of each COICOP class by household for 4912
households in Great Britain (i.e., the UK excluding Northern Ireland).16 Let ηhg denote the expen-
diture share of household h on class g. We then calculate the effect of a 10 percent depreciation
16The data is reported at the level of COICOP items. We map items to classes using a concordance provided by the
ONS.
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on the price of each household’s consumption basket by using the household-specific expenditure
weights to aggregate class-level price changes. That is, we calculate:
pˆC,h =
G∑
g=1
ηhg × ImportShareg × 0.1,
where pˆC,h is the inflation effect on household h due to the Brexit depreciation.
Figure 6 plots the histogram of inflation effects across households, where the households are
weighted such that the distribution is representative across all households in Great Britain. The
bulk of the distribution is concentrated in the range from 2 percent to 4 percent, and the median
is close to our aggregate inflation impact. A household at the 75th percentile of the distribution
experienced a one percentage point higher price increase than a household at the 25th percentile.
This shows that there was considerable heterogeneity across households in how the depreciation
affected the cost of living.
Figure 6: Distribution of inflation effects due to the Brexit depreciation across British households
Notes: This histogram plots the distribution of inflation effects due to the Brexit depreciation
across 4912 households in Great Britain. The households are weighted such that the distribution
is representative across all British households. The effects are computed using household-level
expenditure weights across COICOP classes assuming complete import cost pass-through and a
10 percent depreciation due to the Brexit vote. See text for further details.
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How did the distributional consequences of the referendum vary across different types of house-
hold? To address this question, we repeat the exercise above using the expenditure weights for
household aggregates by income decile and by region. Figure 7 presents inflation effects by decile
of the household income distribution. For each decile we show the estimated inflation increase
due to the Brexit depreciation relative to the 2.9 percent effect for the average UK household.
Decile one is the poorest households, decile ten the richest. Overall, inflation varies little across
income deciles, implying that the cost of living rises due to the referendum shock are evenly
shared throughout the income distribution. This result differs from Cravino and Levchenko (2017)
who find that the 1994 Mexican peso devaluation was anti-poor, to a large extent because poorer
Mexican households spend relatively more on tradeable product categories. By contrast, in our
data there is no systematic correlation between household income and the expenditure share of
imports.17
Figure 7: Inflation effects by income decile due to the Brexit depreciation
Notes: For each decile of the disposable household income distribution we show the estimated
inflation increase due to the Brexit depreciation minus the increase for the average UK household
(in percentage points). Decile 1 captures the poorest households, decile 10 the richest. The
increase for the average UK household is 2.9 percentage points. The effects are computed using
household expenditure weights across COICOP classes by income decile assuming complete
import cost pass-through and a 10 percent depreciation due to the Brexit vote. See text for further
details.
17Cravino and Levchenko (2017) also show that poorer Mexican households consume lower-priced varieties within
product categories, and those faced steeper price increases. We do not have data on cross-household variation in
exposure to import costs within COICOP classes for the UK.
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Figure 8 shows the estimated inflation effects by region, again relative to the average UK
household. Exposure to higher import costs varies considerably across regions.18 The effect is
smallest for London (0.31 percentage points below average) because households in London tend
to spend relatively more on classes with low import shares, such as rent. Households in Northern
Ireland, however, face a considerably larger rise in inflation (0.39 percentage points above average)
because they spend a relatively greater fraction of their income on higher import share classes such
as food and drink, clothing and fuel. Welsh households also face a notable above-average inflation
increase, while differences across the remaining regions are more muted.
Figure 8: Inflation effects by region due to the Brexit depreciation
Notes: For each region we show the estimated inflation increase due to the Brexit depreciation
minus the increase for the average UK household (in percentage points). The increase for the
average UK household is 2.9 percentage points. The effects are computed using household ex-
penditure weights across COICOP classes by region assuming complete import cost pass-through
and a 10 percent depreciation due to the Brexit vote. See text for further details.
8 Conclusions
The UK’s surprise vote in favor of Brexit in June 2016 led to a sharp and unanticipated depreci-
ation in the value of sterling. We use the period around this depreciation to study exchange rate
pass-through to consumer prices. Our identification strategy is based on the fact that exposure to
exchange rate movements varies across products depending upon both the share of household ex-
penditure directly allocated to imported goods and the extent to which imported intermediates are
18Similarly, Cravino and Levchenko (2018) document important inflation differences across Mexican regions in the
wake of the 1994 peso devaluation, with the smallest price increases occurring in Mexico City.
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used in domestic production. To implement this strategy we develop a simple theoretical model of
price determination that shows how to calculate the import share of consumer expenditure using
input-output tables.
Consistent with the model we find that in the two years following the referendum, consumer
price inflation rose more for products with higher import shares and that producer price inflation
rose more for products where imported inputs account for a larger share of production costs. We
also show how our approach can be used to estimate exchange rate pass-through while accounting
for differences in import shares across products and controlling for time fixed effects. We cannot
reject the hypothesis that there is complete pass-through of import costs into consumer prices
which, for the UK, implies an aggregate exchange rate pass-through of 0.29. This is roughly
double the estimate obtained using the same data from a pass-through specification that does not
account for import share heterogeneity.
We use our pass-through estimates to quantify how the roughly 10 percent depreciation of
sterling in the immediate aftermath of the Brexit referendum affected living costs in the UK. Our
preferred estimate is that the depreciation increased consumer prices by 2.9 percent and that this
led to a comparable decline in real wage growth. Increases in the cost of living were similar across
households in different deciles of the income distribution, but not across regions. London suffered
least, while Northern Ireland and Wales were worst hit.
The decision to leave the EU is the most important change in UK economic policy for a gen-
eration. There is a broad consensus among economists that the long-run welfare effects of Brexit
will be negative, but it will be years, if not decades, before these predictions can be tested. How-
ever, as with other financial assets, exchange rate movements are forward looking and our results
document that the Brexit depreciation has already had a sizable negative effect on UK households.
References
Amiti, M., Itskhoki, O., Konings, J., 2019. International shocks, variable markups, and domestic
prices. Review of Economic Studies 86(6), pp. 2356-2402.
Amiti, M., Redding, S., Weinstein, D., 2019. The impact of the 2018 trade war on U.S. prices and
welfare. NBER Working Paper 25672.
Auer, R., Burstein, A., Lein, S., 2018. Exchange rates and prices: evidence from the 2015 Swiss
franc appreciation. BIS Working Paper 751.
Berlingieri, G., Breinlich, H., Dhingra S., 2018. The impact of trade agreements on consumer wel-
fare – evidence from the EU common external trade policy. Journal of the European Economic
Association 6(6), pp. 1881-1928.
Berman, N., Martin, P., Mayer, T., 2012. How do different exporters react to exchange rate
30
changes? Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(1), pp. 437-492.
Bloom, N., Bunn, P., Chen, S., Mizen, P., Smietanka, P., Thwaites, G., Young, G., 2018. Brexit
and uncertainty: insights from the decision maker panel. Fiscal Studies 39(4), pp. 555-580.
Bloom, N., Bunn, P., Chen, S., Mizen, P., Smietanka, P., Thwaites, G., 2019. The impact of Brexit
on UK firms. NBER Working Paper 26218.
Born, B., Mu¨ller, G., Schularick, M., Sedla´cˇek, P., 2019. The costs of economic nationalism:
evidence from the Brexit experiment. Economic Journal 129(623), pp. 2722-2744.
Breinlich, H., Leromain, E., Novy, D., Sampson, T., Usman, A., 2018. The economic effects of
Brexit: evidence from the stock market. Fiscal Studies 39(4), pp. 581-623.
Breinlich, H., Leromain, E., Novy, D., Sampson, T., 2019. Voting with their money: Brexit and
outward investment by UK firms. CEPR Discussion Paper 13850.
Burstein, A., Eichenbaum, M., Rebelo, S., 2005. Large devaluations and the real exchange rate.
Journal of Political Economy 113(4), pp. 742-784.
Burstein, A., Gopinath, G., 2014. International prices and exchange rates. In: Gopinath, G., Help-
man, E., Rogoff, K. (Eds), Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 4, Elsevier, Amsterdam,
pp. 391-451.
Burstein, A., Neves, J., Rebelo, S., 2003. Distribution costs and real exchange rate dynamics during
exchange-rate-based stabilizations. Journal of Monetary Economics 50(6), pp. 1189-1214.
Campa, J., Goldberg, L., 2005. Exchange rate pass-through into import prices. Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 87(4), pp. 679-690.
Chen, N., Chung, W., Novy, D., 2018. Vehicle currency pricing and exchange rate pass-through.
CEPR Discussion Paper 13085.
Corsetti, G., Dedola, L., 2005. A macroeconomic model of international price discrimination.
Journal of International Economics 67(1), pp. 129-155.
Corsetti, G., Dedola, L., Leduc, S., 2008. High exchange-rate volatility and low pass-through.
Journal of Monetary Economics 55(6), pp. 1113-1128.
Corsetti, G., Pesenti, P., 2005. International dimensions of optimal monetary policy. Journal of
Monetary Economics 52(2), pp. 281-305.
Costa, R., Dhingra, S., Machin, S., 2019. Trade and worker deskilling. NBER Working Paper
25919.
Cravino, J., Levchenko, A., 2017. The distributional consequences of large devaluations. American
Economic Review 107(11), pp. 3477-3509.
Cravino, J., Levchenko, A., 2018. The geographic spread of a large devaluation. AEA Papers and
Proceedings 108, pp. 562-566.
Crowley, M., Exton, O., Han, L., 2018. Renegotiation of trade agreements and firm exporting
decisions: evidence from the impact of Brexit on UK exports. Cambridge Working Papers in
31
Economics 1839.
Davies, R., Studnicka, Z., 2018. The heterogeneous impact of Brexit: early indications from the
FTSE. European Economic Review 110, pp. 1-17.
Devereux, M., Engel, C., Tille, C., 2003. Exchange rate pass-through and the welfare effects of
the euro. International Economic Review 44(1), pp. 223-242.
Dhingra, S., Huang, H., Ottaviano, G., Pessoa, J., Sampson, T., Van Reenen, J., 2017. The costs
and benefits of leaving the EU: trade effects. Economic Policy 32(92), pp. 651-705.
Dornbusch, R., 1987. Exchange rates and prices. American Economic Review 77(1), pp. 93-106.
The Economist, 2016. Who said Brexit was a surprise? 24 June 2016.
Evenett, S., 2019. Protectionism, state discrimination, and international business since the onset
of the global financial crisis. Journal of International Business Policy 2(1), pp. 9-36.
Fajgelbaum, P., Goldberg, P., Kennedy, P., Khandelwal, A., 2019. The return to protectionism.
NBER Working Paper 25638.
Flaaen, A., Hortac¸su, A., Tintelnot, F., 2019. The production relocation and price effects of U.S.
trade policy: the case of washing machines. NBER Working Paper 25767.
Forbes, K., Hjortsoe, I., Nenova, T., 2018. The shocks matter: improving our estimates of exchange
rate pass-through. Journal of International Economics 114, pp. 255-275.
Goldberg, L., Campa, J., 2010. The sensitivity of the CPI to exchange rates: distribution margins,
imported inputs, and trade exposure. Review of Economics and Statistics 92(2), pp. 392-407.
Gopinath, G., Itskhoki, O., Rigobon, R., 2010. Currency choice and exchange rate pass-through.
American Economic Review 100(1), pp. 304-336.
Krugman, P., 1987. Pricing to market when the exchange rate changes. In: Arndt, S., Richardson,
J. (Eds), Real-Financial Linkages among Open Economies, MIT Press, Cambridge MA and
London.
Sampson, T., 2017. Brexit: the economics of international disintegration. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 31(4), pp. 163-184.
32
Table 1: Import shares by COICOP division
(1) (2) (3)
COICOP Division Direct Indirect Total
% % %
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 29 14 43
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco 11 13 24
Clothing and footwear 41 8 49
Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels 1 17 18
Furniture, household equipment and maintenance 25 9 34
Health 27 6 33
Transport 22 18 40
Communication 17 17 34
Recreation and culture 15 12 27
Education 1 4 5
Restaurants and hotels 0 17 17
Miscellaneous goods and services 14 12 25
Aggregate 16 14 29
Standard deviation 0.17 0.07 0.17
Notes: The aggregate import share is a weighted average across COICOP classes using
2016 CPI expenditure weights. The standard deviation is unweighted and calculated
across COICOP classes.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
VARIABLES Mean Median Standard deviation Min Max
PANEL A: Two-year periods
CPI inflation 0.021 0.027 0.080 -0.459 0.427
PPI inflation 0.026 0.032 0.096 -0.445 0.396
Oil -0.005 0.000 0.041 -0.262 0.120
CPI Euro area inflation 0.018 0.019 0.056 -0.426 0.264
PPI Euro area inflation 0.010 0.009 0.063 -0.352 0.259
PANEL B: Annual
CPI inflation 0.011 0.014 0.045 -0.296 0.325
Oil -0.002 0.000 0.024 -0.181 0.130
CPI Euro area inflation 0.009 0.010 0.032 -0.219 0.256
PANEL C: Quarterly
CPI inflation 0.004 0.003 0.033 -0.428 0.266
Oil 0.000 0.000 0.009 -0.116 0.100
CPI Euro area inflation 0.003 0.003 0.024 -0.329 0.272
Exchange rate index -0.001 -0.009 0.025 -0.028 0.084
Notes: Panel A reports summary statistics for the two-year period sample using periods from June
2014 to June 2016 and June 2016 to June 2018. Panel B reports summary statistics for the annual
sample using data from 2015-18 for years ending in June. Panel C reports summary statistics
for the quarterly sample from 2011Q1 to 2018Q2. CPI inflation, Oil and CPI Euro area inflation
are computed at the level of 84 COICOP classes. PPI inflation and PPI Euro area inflation are
computed at the level of 42 CPA sectors.
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Table 3: Consumer price event study estimates with two-year periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation difference
Post × Import Share 0.384* 0.248*** 0.211*** 0.194***
(0.207) (0.090) (0.066) (0.061)
Oil 0.792 0.212 -0.041
(0.519) (0.278) (0.175)
Euro area inflation 0.696*
(0.391)
Observations 168 168 168 168
R-squared 0.642 0.755 0.828 0.665
Number of classes 84 84 84 84
Class fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Period fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the UK inflation rate at the
COICOP class level. The dependent variable in column (4) is the difference between
the UK and Euro area inflation rates. Post is a dummy variable for the two-year post-
referendum period (June 2016-June 2018). The pre-referendum period also covers two
years (June 2014-June 2016). OLS estimation. Standard errors in parentheses are clus-
tered by COICOP class. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: Consumer price event study estimates with one-year periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation difference Inflation
Post × Import Share 0.192** 0.128*** 0.110*** 0.088***
(0.073) (0.033) (0.023) (0.020)
2016 × Import Share 0.001
(0.024)
2017 × Import Share 0.116***
(0.027)
2018 × Import Share 0.105***
(0.030)
Oil 0.739** 0.438** 0.067 0.442**
(0.344) (0.201) (0.115) (0.204)
Euro area inflation 0.447* 0.449*
(0.239) (0.243)
Observations 336 336 336 336 336
R-squared 0.335 0.492 0.559 0.191 0.560
Number of classes 84 84 84 84 84
Class fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Period fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) and (5) is the UK inflation rate at the COICOP class
level. The dependent variable in column (4) is the difference between the UK and Euro area inflation
rates. Post is a dummy variable for post-referendum periods (the years up to June 2017 and June
2018). The pre-referendum period covers the years up to June 2015 and June 2016. OLS estimation.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by COICOP class. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Consumer price event study estimates with two-year periods using
basic price import shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation difference
Post × Import Share 0.143** 0.125*** 0.116*** 0.113***
(0.061) (0.037) (0.031) (0.030)
Oil 0.967* 0.329 0.091
(0.565) (0.295) (0.179)
Euro area inflation 0.728*
(0.393)
Observations 168 168 168 168
R-squared 0.562 0.760 0.840 0.692
Number of classes 84 84 84 84
Class fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Period fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the UK inflation rate at the
COICOP class level. The dependent variable in column (4) is the difference between
the UK and Euro area inflation rates. Import shares are measured in terms of basic
prices. Post is a dummy variable for the two-year post-referendum period (June 2016-
June 2018). The pre-referendum period also covers two years (June 2014-June 2016).
OLS estimation. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by COICOP class. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Producer price event study estimates with two-year periods
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES PPI inflation PPI inflation PPI inflation
Post × Producer Import Share 1.044*** 0.534** 0.459**
(0.355) (0.202) (0.210)
Oil 0.746*** 0.544
(0.145) (0.369)
PPI Euro area inflation 0.330
(0.488)
Observations 84 84 84
R-squared 0.762 0.870 0.880
Number of sectors 42 42 42
Sector fixed effects YES YES YES
Period fixed effects YES YES YES
Notes: The dependent variable is the UK PPI inflation rate for 42 CPA sectors. Post
is a dummy variable for the two-year post-referendum period (June 2016-June 2018).
The pre-referendum period also covers two years (June 2014-June 2016). OLS esti-
mation. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by CPA sector. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Producer price event study estimates with two-year periods – strategic complementarities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES PPI Inflation PPI Inflation PPI Inflation PPI Inflation PPI Inflation PPI Inflation
Post × Producer Import Share 1.023** 0.515*** 0.448**
(0.379) (0.189) (0.199)
Post × Direct Import Share at basic prices -0.032 -0.031 -0.024 -0.097 -0.047 -0.034
(0.056) (0.044) (0.049) (0.069) (0.057) (0.058)
Oil 0.745*** 0.555 1.095*** 0.719
(0.135) (0.360) (0.088) (0.465)
PPI Euro area inflation 0.311 0.496
(0.492) (0.532)
Observations 84 84 84 84 84 84
R-squared 0.766 0.873 0.882 0.391 0.822 0.847
Number of sectors 42 42 42 42 42 42
Sector fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Period fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: The dependent variable is the UK PPI inflation rate for 42 CPA sectors. Post is a dummy variable for the two-year post-referendum period
(June 2016-June 2018). The pre-referendum period also covers two years (June 2014-June 2016). OLS estimation. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by CPA sector. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Consumer expenditure share event study estimates with two-year periods
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Consumer Consumer Consumer
Expenditure Share Expenditure Share Expenditure Share
Post × Import Share 0.058 -0.098 -0.194
(0.519) (0.544) (0.564)
Observations 150 150 150
R-squared 0.380 0.390 0.396
Oil NO YES YES
Euro area inflation NO NO YES
Number of classes 75 75 75
Class fixed effects YES YES YES
Period fixed effects NO NO NO
Notes: The dependent variable is the consumer expenditure share at the COICOP class level.
Post is a dummy variable for the two-year post-referendum period. OLS estimation. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by COICOP class. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: Import cost pass-through estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation
Import cost pass-through 0.819*** 0.972*** 1.111*** 1.412*** 1.209***
(0.236) (0.281) (0.365) (0.434) (0.350)
Test: Import cost pass-through=1
F-stat 0.57 0.01 0.09 0.90 0.36
p-value 0.45 0.92 0.76 0.34 0.55
Number of lags 4 5 6 7 8
Observations 2250 2250 2250 2250 2250
R-squared 0.601 0.601 0.601 0.603 0.603
Class×season fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: The dependent variable is the quarterly UK inflation rate at the COICOP class level. The sam-
ple covers 2011Q1 to 2018Q2. The main regressor is the exchange rate change, contemporaneous and
including lags as specified, interacted with import shares by COICOP class. Import cost pass-through is
the sum of the coefficients on all import share interaction terms. Euro area inflation rates by COICOP
class and exposure to oil price changes are included as controls (coefficients not reported). Season fixed
effects refer to the same quarter every year. OLS estimation. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by COICOP class. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10: Exchange rate pass-through estimates without import share interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation
Exchange rate pass-through 0.120*** 0.150*** 0.158*** 0.150*** 0.138***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.036) (0.038) (0.041)
Number of lags 4 5 6 7 8
Observations 2250 2250 2250 2250 2250
R-squared 0.591 0.592 0.592 0.592 0.592
Class×season fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter fixed effects NO NO NO NO NO
Notes: The dependent variable is the quarterly UK inflation rate at the COICOP class level. The
sample covers 2011Q1 to 2018Q2. The main regressor is the exchange rate change, both contem-
poraneous and including lags as specified. Exchange rate pass-through is the sum of the coefficients
on all exchange rate terms. Euro area inflation rates by COICOP class and exposure to oil price
changes are included as controls (coefficients not reported). Season fixed effects refer to the same
quarter every year. OLS estimation. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by COICOP class.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A Data appendix
A.1 Import share calculations
Equation (10) shows that the import share of product group g depends upon the parameters λg, γg,
ζ and θij for i = g,W,R and j = 1, . . . , G. We calculate γg, ζ and θij using the UK Input-Output
Analytical Tables for 2013. The share of imports in expenditure net of distribution costs, γg, is
computed as the ratio of household expenditure on imports of good g to total household expenditure
(domestic and imported) on good g at basic prices. The share of distribution services expenditure
spent on wholesale, ξ, is computed as the ratio of household expenditure on the wholesale sector
(CPA code 46) to household expenditure on the wholesale and retail (CPA code 47) sectors at basic
prices.
The element in row i and column j of the G × G matrix (I − ΩD)−1ΩM is θij . To calculate
ΩD and ΩM we need to know αg, δg, ψgj and µgj for g, j = 1, . . . , G. We compute the share
of intermediate inputs in production costs, αg, as total intermediate consumption (domestic and
imported) by domestic producers of product g over total domestic output of product g. The share
of imports in intermediate input costs, δg, is computed as the share of imported intermediates in
total intermediate consumption by domestic producers of product g. Finally, ψgj is given by the
share of expenditure on product j in domestic intermediate expenditure by domestic producers of
product g from the Domestic Use Table. Similarly, µgj is the share of expenditure on product j
in imported intermediate expenditure by domestic producers of product g from the Imports Use
Table. All these parameters are calculated using data at basic prices.
To measure λg, the share of expenditure on distribution services at purchasers’ prices net of
product taxes, we combine data from the input-output tables with additional information from the
UK Supply and Use Tables for 2013. Let Hg be total household expenditure on product group
g at purchasers’ prices. We can decompose Hg into the components accounted for by imported
goods HMg, domestic goods HDg, distribution services HSg and taxes less subsidies on products
Hτg givingHg = HMg +HDg +HSg +Hτg. Hg can be retrieved from the Combined Use Table at
purchasers’ prices, while HDg and HMg are taken from the Domestic and Imported Use Tables at
basic prices. However, the expenditure on distribution services, HSg, cannot be inferred from the
input-output tables. Instead, we calculate HSg as:
HSg =
Dg
Dg + Tg
(Hg −HMg −HDg) ,
where Dg is given by Distributors’ trading margins for product group g and Tg by Taxes less
subsidies on products. Both Dg and Tg are taken from the Supply of products table in the Supply
and Use Tables. Given HSg, we then calculate λg as:
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λg =
HSg
HMg +HDg +HSg
.
A.2 Oil price variable
To compute the oil price variable, we start by using the framework developed in Section 3 and
the UK Input-Output Analytical Tables for 2013 to calculate the share of consumer expenditure
spent on imported oil (CPA code 06&07) by product group, which we denote OilShareg. We
allow for both direct oil consumption and indirect consumption via the use of oil as an imported
intermediate input. However, it turns out that oil consumption only has an indirect component
because households do not directly consume imported oil (i.e., γoil = 0). As with import shares,
we first compute oil shares for the 105 CPA products in the input-output tables and then use the
ONS concordance to map CPA products to COICOP classes.
The exposure of COICOP class g to oil price changes in period t is then given by:
Oilgt = OilShareg × pˆ
M
Oil,t,
where pˆMOil,t is the log difference in the US dollar denominated price of oil between period t−1 and
period t. We measure the oil prices using the average petroleum spot price Crude Oil index from
the IMF’s Commodity Prices database, which is an average of the prices of Brent Crude, Dubai
Crude and West Texas Intermediate Crude. The index is not available for 2018, so we extrapolate
prices using changes in the price of West Texas Intermediate Crude obtained from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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Table A1: Import shares by COICOP class
Table A1 — Continued on next page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
COICOP class Direct Indirect Total Distribution services
share λg
01.1.1 Bread and cereals 21.63 15.62 37.25 28.20
01.1.2 Meat 30.58 15.33 45.91 31.14
01.1.3 Fish 33.70 11.60 45.31 45.41
01.1.4 Milk, cheese and eggs 22.33 15.50 37.83 49.87
01.1.5 Oils and fats 36.48 11.39 47.87 49.56
01.1.6 Fruit 32.12 14.70 46.82 23.81
01.1.7 Vegetables including potatoes and other tubers 35.83 11.88 47.70 37.37
01.1.8 Sugar, jam, syrups, chocolate and confectionery 30.42 11.67 42.09 54.59
01.1.9 Food products (nec) 31.29 12.26 43.54 46.77
01.2.1 Coffee, tea and cocoa 31.18 11.31 42.49 55.08
01.2.2 Mineral waters, soft drinks and juices 21.27 14.24 35.50 37.56
02.1.1 Spirits 11.36 12.57 23.93 77.09
02.1.2 Wine 11.36 12.57 23.93 77.09
02.1.3 Beer 11.36 12.57 23.93 77.09
02.2 Tobacco 11.36 12.57 23.93 77.09
03.1.2 Garments 45.38 7.29 52.68 53.10
03.1.3 Other clothing and clothing accessories 31.75 9.46 41.20 65.19
03.1.4 Cleaning, repair and hire of clothing 0.60 10.67 11.27 0.00
03.2 Footwear including repairs 26.33 10.43 36.76 22.56
04.1 Actual rentals for housing 0.02 7.61 7.63 0.00
04.3.1 Materials for maintenance and repair 32.09 11.98 44.07 54.23
04.3.2 Services for maintenance and repair 0.00 16.26 16.26 0.00
04.4.1 Water supply 0.00 10.72 10.72 0.00
04.4.3 Sewerage collection 0.00 7.51 7.51 0.00
04.5.1 Electricity 0.12 44.36 44.49 0.00
04.5.2 Gas 0.73 32.34 33.07 0.11
04.5.3 Liquid fuels 44.79 36.68 81.47 9.73
04.5.4 Solid fuels 0.00 33.33 33.33 21.23
05.1.1 Furniture and furnishings 27.77 12.23 40.00 51.65
05.1.2 Carpets and other floor coverings 21.02 11.35 32.37 74.08
05.2 Household textiles 21.02 11.35 32.37 74.08
05.3.1/2 Major appliances and small electric goods 42.47 7.55 50.02 57.48
05.3.3 Repair of household appliances 0.08 14.40 14.47 0.00
05.4 Glassware, tableware and household utensils 31.85 10.46 42.31 60.38
05.5 Tools and equipment for house and garden 32.63 9.41 42.04 64.29
05.6.1 Non-durable household goods 26.96 10.29 37.24 68.47
05.6.2 Domestic services and household services 0.65 0.36 1.02 0.00
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Table A1 — Continued from previous page
06.1.1 Pharmaceutical products 38.89 10.97 49.85 37.08
06.1.2/3 Other medical and therapeutic equipment 42.10 8.24 50.34 53.84
06.2.1/3 Medical services & paramedical services 14.96 2.49 17.45 0.00
06.2.2 Dental services 14.96 2.49 17.45 0.00
06.3 Hospital services 14.96 2.49 17.45 0.00
07.1.1A New cars 56.52 7.23 63.75 28.74
07.1.1B Second-hand cars n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
07.1.2/3 Motorcycles and bicycles 42.74 14.77 57.52 15.41
07.2.1 Spare parts and accessories 65.06 6.09 71.14 30.60
07.2.2 Fuels and lubricants 44.89 36.55 81.44 9.81
07.2.3 Maintenance and repairs 0.05 18.59 18.64 11.85
07.2.4 Other services 0.53 14.88 15.41 0.00
07.3.1 Passenger transport by railway 0.74 14.76 15.50 0.00
07.3.2/6 Passenger transport by road and other transport services 0.06 14.40 14.46 0.00
07.3.3 Passenger transport by air 4.70 26.67 31.37 0.00
07.3.4 Passenger transport by sea and inland waterway 0.06 21.34 21.40 0.00
08.1 Postal services 0.81 16.45 17.25 0.00
08.2/3 Telephone and telefax equipment and services 18.03 16.69 34.71 30.25
09.1.1 Reception and reproduction of sound and pictures 36.01 9.04 45.05 60.50
09.1.2 Photographic, cinematographic and optical equipment 36.01 9.04 45.05 60.50
09.1.3 Data processing equipment 31.62 9.58 41.19 65.25
09.1.4 Recording media 17.23 12.66 29.89 17.81
09.1.5 Repair of audio-visual equipment & related products 0.08 14.40 14.47 0.00
09.2.1/2/3 Major durables for in/outdoor recreation and their maintenance 26.00 11.42 37.42 34.22
09.3.1 Games, toys and hobbies 22.11 11.04 33.15 65.20
09.3.2 Equipment for sport and open-air recreation 39.64 8.34 47.98 57.72
09.3.3 Gardens, plants and flowers 26.01 17.51 43.53 30.83
09.3.4/5 Pets, related products and services 10.17 13.93 24.09 20.06
09.4.1 Recreational and sporting services 5.55 19.99 25.55 0.00
09.4.2 Cultural Services 13.23 12.98 26.21 0.00
09.5.1 Books 14.84 12.59 27.43 52.14
09.5.2 Newspapers and periodicals 14.84 12.59 27.43 52.14
09.5.3/4 Misc. printed matter, stationery, drawing materials 27.07 11.38 38.45 49.84
09.6 Package holidays 0.26 8.51 8.77 0.00
10.0 Education 0.82 4.14 4.96 0.00
11.1.1 Restaurants and cafes 0.00 16.60 16.60 0.01
11.1.2 Canteens 0.00 16.60 16.60 0.01
11.2 Accommodation services 0 18.42 18.42 0.00
12.1.1 Hairdressing and personal grooming establishments 0.72 10.24 10.96 0.00
12.1.2/3 Appliances and products for personal care 33.65 9.13 42.79 63.77
12.3.1 Jewellery, clocks and watches 25.60 10.15 35.75 67.08
12.3.2 Other personal effects 32.17 11.40 43.57 54.44
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12.4 Social Protection 3.14 12.45 15.58 0.00
12.5.2 House contents insurance 0.02 16.19 16.20 0.00
12.5.3/5 Health insurance and other insurance 0.02 16.19 16.20 0.00
12.5.4 Transport insurance 0.02 16.19 16.20 0.00
12.6.2 Other financial services (nec) 0.05 15.13 15.19 0.00
12.7 Other services (nec) 1.00 10.78 11.78 0.00
Notes: Column (1) reports the direct import share in percent. Column (2) reports the indirect import share in
percent. Column (3) reports their sum, i.e., the total import share. Column (4) reports the share of distribution
services in expenditure, λg , in percent.
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